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This research seeks to determine whether the Job Opportunities and
Basic Skills GOBS) program (established under the 1988 Family Support
Act) was successful in reducing the number of welfare recipients among
U.S. states for the period 1984 to 1996. Within the context of two theo-
retical perspectives-developmental and rational choice-we assess the
impact of JOBS on AFDC participation rates using a pooled time-series
design. At best, JOBS had a minimal effect. We estimate that states with
higher proportions of their AFDC populations enrolled in JOBS programs
had only slightly lower rates of participation in AFDC. Other forces were
far more influential in reducing welfare participation. In particular, states
with higher per capita income, lower female unemployment rates, lower
poverty rates, and higher wages for low-paying jobs had the lowest wel-
fare recipiency The AFDC participation rates of neighboring states had a
significant effect, as well. The analysis showed that more generous AFDC
benefits exerted strong upward pressure on a state's welfare rolls.
The landmark 1996 legislation ending "welfare as we know it" contained an
overarching theme captured in its operative phrase "temporary assistance for
needy families" (TANF). Welfare would no longer provide a never-ending sub-
sidy to poor mothers. Public assistance was to be replaced, above all, by employ-
ment. The act represented the culmination of a new consensus on welfare that
emerged beginning in about the mid-1980s. With TANF, the idea of reciprocity
or social contract had now replaced the notion of welfare as merely entitlement.
The 1996 law was not the first, of course, to feature work as a basic alternative
to welfare. For several decades, beginning in 1967 with the WIN (Work Incen-
tive) program, reformers have pushed for more emphasis on work. Since most
observers considered WIN largely a failure (Gordon 1978), the quest for welfare
NOTE: An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the 1997 American
Political Science Association.
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reform continued. The next major change came with the 1988 Family Assistance
Act and its centerpiece, the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (GOBS) program.
It required states to increase the proportion of able-bodied AFDC recipients that
were engaged in work activities.
By the late 1980s, evidence was accumulating that welfare-to-work policies
could be effective. The most extensive assessment of such programs came from
the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC). During the 1980s,
this group undertook a series of multi-state classical, random assignment field
experiments to test the efficacy of work programs (Gueron and Pauly 1991). In
brief, MDRC's evaluations concluded that the answer is clearly yes to the ques-
tion of whether welfare-to-work programs produce positive results. While field
experiments can generate valuable results, such research can be usefully supple-
mented by other studies that compare the effectiveness of work across multiple
jurisdictions. The latter approach can take account of social, economic, and cul-
tural forces that may influence the implementation of legislation such as the
Family Support Act. Although a few studies have examined the operation of
JOBS in one or several states (Mead 1997; Nathan 1993), almost no aggregate,
comparative state studies assess the effectiveness of JOBS while controlling for
other potentially important effects (however, see Mead 1995).
This research seeks to ascertain whether the JOBS program has affected wel-
fare (AFDC) recipiency over a recent period of 13 years. We test for the influence
of JOBS within a theoretical model that incorporates variables from two perspec-
tives-developmental forces and rational choice. The dependent variable for all 50
states is an AFDC recipiency rate for the years 1984 through 1996. We test three
JOBS-related measures: (1) percentage of welfare recipients active in JOBS; (2) the
dollar per recipient amount spent by each state; and (3) a JOBS scope variable.
EXPLAINING INTERSTATE VARIATION IN WELFARE RECIPIENCY
Our framework for assessing the efficacy of the JOBS program draws on two
somewhat different explanations, one that relies on a developmental interpreta-
tion and one based on individual self-interest. The work of Isaac and Kelly
(1981, 1982) provides the most thorough treatment of the "orthodox" develop-
ment/modernization theory. An economic development interpretation views wel-
fare expansion as a result of a sequential process. Basically, the demographic,
social, and economic changes brought on by modernization create dislocations
among certain groups. Those with fewer skills and less education get left behind
as advanced polities become increasingly committed to an information-based
global economy. Yet modernization clearly creates benefits for the larger society,
primarily for our purposes in the form of economic surplus to support expanded
social programs. Thus, the economic development thesis recognizes that
advanced societies not only bring societal dislocations but also generate the
resources to support policies to alleviate the ensuing distress.
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Gronbjerg (1977: 8-17) offers a refinement of the modernization approach.
Relying on Shils (1975: 91-107), she argues that modernization leads to "mass
societies" in which the values of the center spread to the periphery. In such poli-
ties, characterized by high levels of wealth, education, and voter participation,
the well-being of the periphery becomes of greater concern to policymakers.
These states spawn political cultures that support an expansion of economic and
citizenship rights to include previously neglected and marginalized groups. One
of the policy consequences, according to Gronbjerg (14), is more generous wel-
fare payments, less punitive eligibility requirements, less stigma attached to
public assistance, and therefore more people receiving such aid. Conversely, poor
or less modern states may have a greater need for public relief, but they also are
more inclined to take a restrictive and punitive approach to those who qualify.
And these poorer states operate under greater fiscal constraints, leading to lower
benefit levels aimed primarily at the "truly needy" and designed to discourage
"abuse." In effect, in developed states, public assistance itself becomes a means
of extending citizenship or social rights to a larger proportion of the population.
During the period from 1960-1970, Gronbjerg (1977: 155) found that welfare
rolls rose predominantly in U.S. states with "high mass society status."
Following Gronbjerg (1977), we end up with two somewhat different devel-
opmental interpretations for the changes in welfare rolls in the U.S. In backward
states, absolute need is greater, increasing the pressure to expand the rolls. But,
benefits may be niggardly. Among the more modern and wealthier states, there will
be an expectation that people are entitled to assistance from the government. This
presumption contributes to lenient or generous public aid policies among such
jurisdictions. In effect, "both propositions suggest that welfare rolls will be high in
both backward and mass society states-in the wealthy as well as the poor states"
(Gronbjerg 1977: 15). Operationally, one might expect a curvilinear effect from
state wealth. A developmental approach also stresses the importance of need or
"demand" for welfare. Demand may arise from the consequences of family disor-
ganization (especially among black families) and the subsequent growth of female-
headed households, dependent children, and their resultant poverty status. Isaac
and Kelly (1982) found urbanization to be the most useful surrogate for develop-
mental effects. In the public mind, with some justification, welfare is seen as a large
inner-city problem. Welfare dependency among ghetto minority mothers who have
little exposure to the workplace may be the most intractable form of all. Some
observers even consider the root cause of welfare dependency to be the values held
by individuals who are isolated from mainstream America (Kaus 1992 chap. 7;
Wilson 1987: 61). In the subsequent analysis, we discovered that both poverty and
percentage black were useful predictors of AFDC recipiencyl
Mead's (1997) research on the JOBS program among certain Wisconsin counties shows that those
jurisdictions with a higher percentage of African Americans had more difficulty placing AFDC
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Presumably, more modem or progressive states should offer more generous
benefits, leading to an expansion of the welfare rolls. But such states should also
be more advanced economically, with more opportunities for marginal groups to
gain employment. So, a person in such a state who might qualify for AFDC ben-
efits has a twofold advantage. If she doesn't find a job, she may expect to receive
more generous public assistance. Either way, a low-income mother may improve
her position vis-a-vis someone in a less developed state. At some point, then, in
an analysis of changes in welfare recipiency, one must pay attention to the
process by which individuals make decisions about welfare and work.2
Economists have long engaged in such an enterprise, usually working with
data on individual welfare recipients (Moffitt 1992). Using a microlevel theoreti-
cal perspective, these scholars employ a rational-choice (or labor market) frame-
work to explain why poor women with children might choose welfare instead of
employment. The relationship between welfare and work is thus seen in the con-
text of individual self-interest, as a tradeoff between "income and leisure options"
(Danziger et al. 1981: 979). The usual assumption, of course, is that if work does-
n't pay enough, poor single mothers will opt for the dole. Considerable research
shows that welfare programs do "create significant work disincentives" (Blau and
Robins 1986; Danziger et al. 1981). Also, according to most studies, as AFDC
benefits rise so do the welfare rolls (Tweedie 1994). An increase in earnings, on
the other hand, reduces welfare participation (Moffitt 1992). Thus, if states reduce
welfare benefits (increasing the cost of leisure), the act of remaining on AFDC
becomes more expensive (Plant 1984). Recipients then might seek work instead.
The analysis below will include each state's average monthly AFDC payment.
Economists and others also typically find that unemployment increases
AFDC caseloads (Fording 1997; Moffitt 1983). If the economy lags, even well-
motivated recipients may encounter difficulty leaving AFDC. So, availability of
jobs may be crucial, especially for low-income women. In short, according to
rational choice theory, the key to understanding welfare recipiency is the relative
recipients in jobs and had lower rates of case closure. In addition to percentage black and poverty,
we tried a measure of urbanization-percentage of a state's population residing in cities of 250,000
or over, along with other measures of family disorganization. The large city measure was a good
predictor of AFDC recipiency but declined in importance when we included it with the percent-
age black measure. Overall, two measures of need were most robust-percentage in poverty and
percentage African American.
2 Some readers might question the use of microeconomic theory (rational choice) for research on
political jurisdictions such as states. Economists Brennan and Buchanan (1980: 28-29) support
the application of micro-level theories to collectivities by relying on an "as if' model of "govern-
ment as an entity." In fact, Dunleavy (1991: 255) reports that neo-classical economists conven-
tionally treat collective bodies as if they were individuals. Economists are not alone in this usage.
For other studies applying individual-level explanations to the behavior of states or localities, see
Peterson and Rom (1989), and especially Plotnick and Winters (1985).
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attractiveness of work (labor market forces) compared to the income guarantee
from AFDC (Ellwood 1994: 71).3
In addition to AFDC benefits, we should assess the effects of the labor
market directly The whole purpose ofJOBS, of course, was to move welfare par-
ents from AFDC to self sufficiency, usually defined as work. So we need a wage-
rate variable that especially applies to women with few skills and little formal
education. In the subsequent analysis, we use the average monthly wage for a
person employed in the "food and drink" service area. This figure is one of the
lowest wages among dozens of service wage rates listed in Department of Labor
publications.
We include one additional policy-related effect. Abundant research shows
that policies of individual states are influenced by the behavior of their neighbors
(Walker 1969; more recently Berry and Berry 1992). So, the analysis encom-
passes such an effect, or perhaps in a statistical sense, a spatial lag term. States
learn from each other but also engage in competition, as policymakers try to
enhance the economic attractiveness of their jurisdictions (Peterson 1981: 17-
38). As applied to welfare, most observers assume that states generally wish to
avoid generous benefits, along with high taxes, as a way of promoting a favorable
business climate. If welfare payments are too high, the state might become overly
attractive to the poor from neighboring states. Findings on the presence of wel-
fare magnet states are inconclusive.4 Still, Case et al. (1989) have shown that
states do take account of their neighbors' welfare policy They find that a state's
per capita welfare expenditure is positively and significantly affected by the
expenditure of its neighbors. Thus, a state with generous benefits might experi-
ence pressure to reduce payment levels to avoid attracting welfare recipients from
nearby jurisdictions.
Finally, we come to theJOBS program. Can we have any hope that such gov-
ernment interventions can overcome the abundant external forces influencing
the tradeoff between welfare and work? The judgment on JOBS is more favorable
than for its immediate predecessor the WIN program. Previously, we mentioned
the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation's (MDRC) use of field exper-
3 In addition to the actual monthly AFDC payment, we also tested for the effects of food stamps and
Medicaid. When we added food stamps to the AFDC benefit, the combined variable loses its
explanatory power, although otherwise the regression equation remains about the same. As a sep-
arate predictor, food stamps adds nothing to R2, and changes little else. Medicaid payments are
even more problematic. No state-by-state Medicaid data are available for AFDC recipients only.
And, such Medicaid benefits represent only about 25 percent of total Medicaid payments nation-
ally (the bulk of such spending is targeted to institutions caring for the elderly poor). In all, we
decided against including either food stamps or Medicaid benefits in the subsequent analysis.
4 Peterson and Rom (1989) find such an effect. For recent research showing that poor single moth-
ers with children are not more likely than others to move to states with higher benefits see Schram
et al. (1998).
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iments to evaluate the JOBS program. The MDRC findings are complex, but some
state welfare-to-work programs do help AFDC recipients gain employment. Gen-
erally, however, such programs were not successful in helping their graduates
find better paying jobs. In addition to the field experiments from MDRC, single
state studies corroborate the potential of government programs to reduce welfare
caseloads (Schiller and Brasher 1993). According to Mead (1995), states that
more fully implemented JOBS had a smaller rise in welfare participation even
controlling for other influences (also Mead 1997).
Regardless of favorable assessments forJOBS, Glazer (1995: 24) comments on
the program's "remarkably limited numerical goals" for moving people off welfare
and into jobs. Part of the problem was implementation. Nathan (1993) identifies
several difficulties. In particular, he mentions rising state budgets and the national
recession as constraints limiting the §tates' response to JOBS. Many jurisdictions
had a hard time finding the money necessary to match federal funds available
under FSA. Because of such constraints, in an average month from 1991 to 1993,
JOBS served only about 11 percent of AFDC parents (U.S. General Accounting
Office 1994, 2). Overall, JOBS had only limited success. According to Nathan
(1993, 109), JOBS did not spur leaders to alter welfare or to engage in far-reaching
welfare reform. Still, Schiller and Brasher (1990) claim that even the threat of a
work requirement may have a significant deterrent effect on potential recipients.
In sum, despite research showing that JOBS may achieve desirable results in
some instances, we subscribe to the null hypothesis. The evidence is too strong
that the real explanation for the changes in AFDC rates comes from a vector of
powerful external forces. So, the analysis to follow will evaluate the effects of
JOBS by incorporating control variables from the rational-choice model plus
other measures that appear to represent the influence of socioeconomic develop-
ment among the American states.
DATA AND METHODS
The dependent variable for the analysis to follow is welfare participation or
recipiency-the total number of AFDC recipients divided by the state's popula-
tion (minus those age 65 and over) for each state for each year from 1984 to
1996.5 AFDC participation actually declined slightly during the early 1980s.
Then, in about 1989, the curve reflects an abrupt and steep rise. Following this
5 In an earlier version of this article, we also used the number of AFDC families divided by the total
number of single-parent households. But, "households" and "families" are not identical. As best we
can determine, the census bureau does not publish family data by state for each year. The use of
household data instead of families could introduce potential bias in the analysis. Therefore, we
elected to go with the more straightforward measure-numbers of persons on AFDC per population
(less those over 65 years of age). Removing the aged from the denominator yields a final dependent
variable that is more substantively precise than merely using the total population of a state.
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Rate = AFDC recipients per 100 non-elderly persons.
dramatic increase, the welfare rolls began to level off and show an actual decline
by 1994 (Figure).
In the initial stage of the analysis, we tested for three possible effects of the
JOBS program: (1) JOBS expenditures; (2) JOBS participation; and (3) a JOBS
scope variable, an additive measure representing the degree to which states had
implemented up to five optional services to JOBS participants-on the job train-
ing, community work experience, work supplementation programs, other work
experience, and the presence of a "contract" between agency and participant.
Only the JOBS participation measure (the number of "countable" JOBS partici-
pants divided those who were "mandated" to participate) was useful in the equa-
tion to follow.6 Nationwide, in 1994, about 44 percent of AFDC adults were
6 The source of these data, the Green Book (U.S. Congress, various years), refers to these partici-
pants as "countable" in contrast to a typically larger category "active." Those recipients not
required to participate include, for example, pregnant women, women caring for a child under
three years old, and those persons working 30 or more hours a week. No JOBS data by state are
available for 1993. Figures for that year are interpolations using 1992 and 1994 data. Some
observers might question the accuracy ofJOBS data, which come from individual states. Perhaps
states provided numbers that err on the high side, for example. We would offer several observa-
tions on this point. First, the law merely required that each state achieve a minimum participation
rate of only 15 percent of nonexempt persons for 1994. Although there was wide variation among
the states on participation (mean for 1994 was 21.6 percent), no state was penalized for failing to
meet the 15 percent standard (U.S. Congress 1996: 422). Second, the year-by-year correlations for
the variable (e.g., 1995 with 1996) are highly stable, ranging from .89 to .93 (five correlations).
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required to participate in JOBS (U.S. Congress 1996). The JOBS variable is
lagged one year so that its effects do not operate simultaneously with AFDC
recipiency.
We include control variables from the two theoretical frameworks discussed
above-developmental and rational choice. Under developmental forces we
include five controls (source for all variables is U.S. Bureau of Census unless
otherwise noted):
Per capita income.7
Per capita income squared-the square of per capita income. We include this
term, following Gronbjerg (1977), to test specifically for a curvilinear effect
from our primary measure of development.8
Poverty-the percentage of families below the poverty level.
Percentage black-the percentage of a state's population that is African-
American.
Births to unmarried women-the percentage of all live births to unmarried
women.
Female unemployment (rate)- this variable gauges the pressure arising from
fluctuations in the economy that may prompt women to consider AFDC as
an alternative to employment.
The rational choice approach typically tries to model the tradeoff between
employment and welfare benefits. Economists routinely include the unemploy-
ment rate in their analyses of welfare participation. But we place that measure in
the developmental category So, we end up with only the relationship between
AFDC benefits and wages to represent rational choice:
AFDC benefit-the average monthly AFDC family payment in hundred dollars.
Wages-the average monthly wage for the "food and drink services" category
in hundred dollars (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics).
We also tried two policy variables that could affect AFDC recipiency, but
without success. They included, first, a measure of child care (expenditures per
AFDC recipient for child care services). The Family Support Act provided child
care assistance to AFDC recipients engaged in some kind of work or JOBS activ-
7 We also included gross state product and the square of that term in the following equation. It per-
formed less well than the per capita income measure.
8 Following Aiken and West (1991: 32-36), we center both the base and quadratic term to avoid or
minimize multicollinearity We also tried adding squared terms for poverty and percentage black;
neither was useful in the subsequent equation.
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ity. Second, we included a "waivers" variable to capture differences across states
in securing welfare waivers from the national government (coded 0 until a state
obtained any JOBS waiver and 1 for each separate waiver in subsequent years
(range 0-3)). Neither of these two measures were useful and contributed almost
nothing to explained variance. We dropped them from the analysis.
The final equation also includes a spatially lagged AFDC participation rate
(recipients divided by the population under age 65). This variable, which takes
account of conditions in neighboring states, is the average recipiency rate for
adjoining states.9 (For Alaska and Hawaii the "adjoining" states are Washington and
California, respectively.) As noted above, some scholars report that states set their
AFDC benefits partly in response to those of their neighbors (Tweedie 1994).10
The analysis employs a time-series cross-section (TSCS) design (often called
pooled time series or pooled cross section) for the years 1984-1996. This design is
ideally suited for the assessment of changes over time in AFDC participation. It is
capable of analyzing multiple units (states) for multiple years. JOBS data are avail-
able beginning only in 1990, yet a larger number of years can provide both a larger
number of observations and a more stable time series. In some respects, one might
consider the effects of JOBS as a policy intervention, since it is coded zero for all
years before 1990. With 50 states and 13 years, the N for the equation is 650.
Despite its advantages, a TSCS design is subject to certain statistical prob-
lems, namely autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Sayrs 1989; Stimson 1985).
Our design is cross-sectionally dominant; the number of states exceeds the
number of years. According to Stimson (1985: 926), "Cross-sectional dominance
simultaneously minimizes the threat of autocorrelated error and maximizes
the possibility of bias (or inefficiency) from the specification of unit effects." Thus
in our analysis, our most serious threat is biased estimators rather than autocor-
relation. Still, we tested for autoregressive effects and found no evidence of con-
tamination from correlated error terms. Therefore, our regression model is esti-
mated with ordinary least squares. Following Beck and Katz (1995, 645), we
determine statistical significance by calculating panel corrected standard errors.
FINDINGS
Table 1 displays the time-series regression model estimating AFDC recipi-
ency for all 50 states for the years 1984 through 1996. All the proxies for devel-
9 We think a spatial lag term is preferable to using a fixed effects model with dummy variables for
each state. Adding such binary variables is largely an atheoretical attempt to increase explained
variance with measures that might capture certain unusual but unknown characteristics of various
states.
i0 The characteristics of all variables are available from the authors.
ii We used the MATRIX capabilities of SHAZAM to calculate panel-corrected standard errors. Our
program is available on request.
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opmental forces are positive and reasonably strong. First, we might examine a
prime measure of state modernization-per capita income. Both that measure
and its square are useful regressors. The positive sign for income (b = 1.36)
reveals that states with more resources tend to have more people on welfare. But
this is not the whole story. The negative squared income term (b = -.88) indi-
cates a curvilinear effect. In general, this finding partly confirms Gronbjerg's
(1977) mass society hypothesis. State wealth apparently engenders a political
culture that spawns more generous welfare programs, encouraging more partici-
pation and dispensing higher benefits.'2 As states reach a certain level of afflu-
ence, however, the recipiency rate levels off and begins to decline.
The positive sign for poverty shows that need also stimulates higher levels
of welfare participation. As the poverty rate rises by 1 percentage point, AFDC
recipiency should also increase about .11 percentage points. A similar effect
occurs for our prime manifestation of social disorganization-percentage of
births to unmarried women. Here a 1 percentage point growth in unwed moth-
erhood produces about a 10 increase in the participation rate. Welfare recipiency
is only moderately sensitive to percentage black. A 1 percentage point difference
among the states in this variable should produce about a .03 difference in the
dependent variable. However, the unemployment rate among women is one of
the stronger developmental effects. As female unemployment goes up by 1 per-
centage point, the proportion of the population on welfare also should climb
about .30 percentage points. For example, the number of AFDC recipients for
the average state for this 13-year period is 238,150 while the mean for popula-
tion (minus age 65 and above) is 4,378,352, indicating a 5.44 percent participa-
tion rate. Assume female unemployment increases by 1 percentage point, driving
AFDC participation up by .30 to 5.74. This results in about 13,266 additional
AFDC recipients (.00303 * 4,378,352 = 13,266). In all, the level of economic
and social development among states produces the expected effect-higher levels
of modernization provide resources that enable states to respond more gener-
ously to those in need. At the same time, modernization produces certain dys-
functional consequences. The result: greater need for public assistance and more
welfare recipients.
Now we turn to those measures representing the tradeoff between work and
welfare. The relationship between benefits, wages, and the AFDC rate is consis-
tent with rational choice theory. The amount of the monthly AFDC check has a
powerful stimulative effect on participation. The coefficient of .91 indicates that
a $100 increase in the amount of the family benefit is associated with an esti-
mated .91 percentage point rise in the AFDC recipient rate. The effect of low-
12 Over the years, many studies have found a positive connection between various measures of state
wealth and more generous redistributive policies, including higher AFDC benefits (see DeLeon
1973; Plotnick and Winters 1985).
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-
TABLE 1
EXPLAINING AFDC PARTICIPATION RATES, 1984-1996
Unstandardized Panel-corrected
Independent Variables Coefficients Standard Errors T Ratios
Per Capita Income 1.360 0.402 3.38**
Per Capita Income Squared Term -0.883 0.317 -2.78**
Poverty Rate 0.114 0.020 5.75**
Percentage of Births to Unmarried Women 0.104 0.010 10.32**
Unemployment Rate for Females 0.303 0.037 8.22**
Percentage Black 0.027 0.003 8.69**
Average Monthly AFDC Family Payment 0.906 0.048 19.03* *
Average Monthly Wage for Food and Drink -0.522 0.060 -8.65**
Spatially-Lagged AFDC Participation Rate 0.189 0.032 5.83**
JOBS Participation (Lagged One Year) -0.008 0.005 -1.63





* - p < .05, one-tailed test
** = p < .01, one-tailed test
wage employment is not quite so strong. A $100 average improvement in earn-
ings should produce a .52 decrease in AFDC participation. This contrasting effect
of work and welfare suggests that being on the AFDC rolls carries benefits
beyond just the monthly payment itself. Observers have long pointed to the
ancillary advantages of welfare, beyond the mere money it provides. We are
unable to test for other influences directly. But the larger effect for the AFDC
dollar compared to a dollar of increased earnings is entirely consistent with the
argument that costs increase, especially for child care and health care, when
women move from welfare to employment.
The results from Table 1 also show that state welfare policy responds to
other external factors, especially interstate competition (Soule and Zylan 1997).
The coefficient for the spatial lag term is positive and statistically significant. A I
percentage point average increase in AFDC recipients (per population less than
age 65) in adjoining states increases AFDC participation in the state they all
adjoin by .19 percentage point. This variable could be capturing regional effects,
or perhaps states try to avoid becoming "welfare magnets" by adopting benefit
levels similar to those of their neighbors.
Now we come to the JOBS measure. Its coefficient of -.01 shows a modest
effect, one that falls just short of the .05 level of statistical significance (p = .10;
a t ratio of -1.65 is needed for the .05 level; one-tailed test). Still, this means that
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_ TABLE 2
THE MODEL APPLIED TO MINNESOTA, 1995-1996
% Point Change * Change in
Variables Change Coefficient Coefficient Recipients
Per Capita Income .57 1.360 .7752 31,570
Per Capita Income Squared Term .75 -.883 -.6623 -26,727
Poverty Rate .60 .114 .0684 2,786
Percentage of Births to Unmarried Women .50 .104 .0520 2,118
Unemployment Rate for Females .10 .303 .0303 1,234
Percentage Black .06 .027 .0016 66
Average Monthly AFDC Family
Payment (00) -.44 .906 -.3986 -16,235
Average Monthly Wage for
Food and Drink (00) .26 -.522 -.1357 -5,527
Spatially-Lagged AFDC
Participation Rate -.43 .189 -.0813 -3,310
JOBS Participation (Lagged One Year) 2.00 -.008 -.0160 -652
Per Capita Income and Per Capita Income Squared Term are standardized by z-score (centered).
a 1 percentage point increase in the countable proportion ofJOBS "mandatories"
leads to a .01 decrease in the rate of AFDC participation the following year. In
the typical case a 1 percentage point increase in JOBS participation would reduce
the following year's AFDC caseload by about 350 recipients (.008% * 4,378,352).
Finally, we might observe that the equation in Table 1 is reasonably robust
(R2 = .60) with an acceptably low standard error. Per capita income and its
squared term are correlated at .99, and each has a very high variance inflation
factor (Fox 1991). Yet, both variables are statistically significant, and the model
is stable when we add and drop each of them successively from the equation.
We might include one more example to illustrate the estimated effects of the
different independent variables for a single state. Minnesota provides a good case
study Its population is close to the national average for states, and Minnesota fits
the model well. Table 2 shows the effects of changes experienced from 1995 to
1996 to illustrate these dynamics. Applying the model to actual data indicates an
increase of 4,600 AFDC recipients owing to higher per capita income. An
increase of 0.6 percentage points in the poverty rate is associated with 2,786
additional recipients. Births to unmarried mothers increased by half a percentage
point, swelling the rolls by 2,118. The one-tenth of a point increase in unem-
ployment translates to 1,234 new recipients. A slight increase in the proportion
of African Americans works out to 66 additional recipients.
The remaining variables are associated with decreases in AFDC participa-
tion. The average monthly AFDC check in Minnesota dropped by $44 for 1996.
This change is associated with a decrease of 16,235 recipients. Meanwhile wages
878
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016prq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Work and Welfare in the American States
increased by 26 dollars a month, which would lead us to expect a decrease of
5,527 more people. An additional decline of 3,310 is expected due to neighbor
effects. This leaves the JOBS measure. Minnesota increased its JOBS participation
measure by 2 percentage points from 1995 to 1996. The mean for all states for
all years (24 percent) is about the same as Minnesota's during these two years
(19.17 percent and 21.16 percent, respectively). As Table 2 indicates, Min-
nesota's increase in JOBS participation is associated with a decrease of 652 AFDC
recipients. This is not a large effect, of course, when compared with the other
components of the model.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, until about the mid-1990s, the nation's welfare rolls had
risen abruptly Under growing public pressure, U.S. policymakers sought various
ways of slowing what seemed an inexorable trend. Determined to keep welfare
from becoming a way of life, lawmakers searched for ways to encourage poor
women to eschew welfare in favor of gainful employment. Many observers hailed
the 1988 Family Assistance Act, which established the JOBS program, as a valu-
able step in the effort to move recipients from welfare to work. Field studies
revealed that JOBS did achieve its desired effect under certain conditions in cer-
tain states. But few attempts have assessed the efficacy of the program in a
broader context over time.
The research reported here tested the effectiveness ofJOBS among all states
over a 13-year period. Its impact, operationalized as a participation measure, was
modest, at best. As more and more AFDC recipients became involved in JOBS
activities, the proportion of the state's nonelderly population on AFDC declined
ever so slightly The time-series regression equation showed that a 1 percentage
point increase in JOBS participation, on average, should have reduced the pro-
portion of nonelderly persons on welfare by only about .01 percentage points.
From the outset, we had assumed that the external forces influencing wel-
fare participation would overwhelm the effects of such a limited policy interven-
tion as JOBS. Indeed, the analysis showed that interstate variation over time
resulted primarily from two major forces-the degree of state modernization and
individual self-interest on the part of low-income mothers. Several proxies for
state development or modernization were useful in estimating changes in welfare
recipiency over time. For example, if female unemployment went up, so did the
welfare numbers. We discovered a curvilinear effect for state resources; both
affluent states and those with more poverty had higher AFDC participation rates.
States with higher proportions of African Americans also had more people on
welfare. In addition, the analysis showed that welfare policy in one state has a
positive spillover effect on neighboring states.
The results also are consistent with a rational choice interpretation. More
generous AFDC payments had a strong positive impact on welfare recipiency For
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each additional 100 dollars of monthly benefits a state might pay, welfare rolls
should go up almost 1 percentage point. Wages had the opposite effect. Higher
pay for low-income employment tended to reduce AFDC rolls.
Although our results suggest that the JOBS work requirement was largely
ineffectual, we should acknowledge the apparent success of the 1996 welfare
reform legislation. TANF, above all, is predicated on the efficacy of work. And,
the last few years have brought dramatic changes in public assistance. The
nation's strong economy coupled with welfare reform has brought an extraordi-
nary transformation in the welfare rolls. From January 1994 to September 1997,
the welfare caseload dropped by a remarkable 30 percent (U.S. General Account-
ing Office 1998). Despite this remarkable success, we might offer a few brief
observations on what may lie ahead.
First, with the recent dramatic decline in welfare participation, the easiest
cases undoubtedly have been resolved. As the rolls downsize further, the task of
moving clients from welfare to work clearly becomes much harder. Indeed, some
observers estimate that up to one-third of welfare recipients are basically unem-
ployable (Milbank 1997). Second, of those former recipients who do find jobs,
many will require substantial and continuous support to remain employed. And,
even with employment, most former welfare recipients will not escape poverty
(Glazer 1995: 29). Jencks (1997), among others, also argues that many former
welfare mothers with new jobs will be worse off financially than before because
of child care, health, and transportation costs. Third, some local officials worry
about a potential job shortage for former welfare clients, especially if the nation's
economy slows significantly. Localities may have to commit ever more resources
to job search assistance, training, even public employment programs.
Finally, we might reflect on the origins of these recent large-scale changes in
public aid. These developments would seem to confirm Teles's (1996: 164-66)
basic theme. Writing before the recent changes in law, he argued that a funda-
mental transformation was unlikely unless or until the nation's elites could rec-
oncile their ideological differences over welfare. The public's view has been
unequivocal; every competent adult should work, and government policy should
further that end. The barrier to this objective, according to Teles, has been the
disparity between public preferences and elite attitudes. Almost from the begin-
ning, Teles contends that welfare, loaded down with moral baggage, has been the
source of major ideological divisions among political elites. Especially in recent
years, certain leaders have used welfare politics as a wedge issue to wage what he
calls a "vicious cultural war" (p. vii). This failure of elites to agree over the nec-
essary changes in AFDC had produced an impasse, ensuring that public policy
did not reflect the country's views on public aid. With the election of a Republi-
can majority in the House in 1994, the stage was set for a convergence between
elite and public attitudes. The president was on record favoring the ending of
welfare as we know it. And the House majority was committed both to imposing
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stringent work requirements and handing policy implementation over to the
states. With the 1996 law, the long-standing dissensus between public and elite
attitudes had finally been resolved.
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